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 CONSUMER PROTECTION—EXPLORING PRIVATE 
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR VICTIMS OF DATA BREACHES 
Justin H. Dion* & Nicholas M. Smith† 
Data breaches are becoming a norm in modern life.  Every year it seems 
that bigger and bigger attacks are launched, and more and more 
individuals are harmed.  The law has responded by increasing states’ 
ability to prosecute cybercriminals.  A glaring hole exists in this 
protection though.  The state is largely an unharmed party.  The real 
harm is done to individual citizens affected by the breaches.  Their data 
is compromised, their identities are stolen, and their livelihoods are 
placed at risk.  This Article will analyze the issue and propose a solution 
for increased consumer protection in addition to the current criminal 
punishments. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumers increasingly transmit financial and personally identifiable 
information online to government, banking, and private corporations 
(collectively “business”).1  Depending on the online transaction, 
consumers will often electronically transmit their personal demographic 
information.2  If engaging in a commercial transaction, the consumer will 
 
* Justin Dion is a Professor of Legal Skills and Director of Bar Admissions Program at 
Western New England University School of Law. 
 † Nicholas Smith is a third-year law student and a Note Editor for the Western New 
England Law Review. 
1. See E-Commerce Worldwide—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/
topics/871/online-shopping/ [https://perma.cc/QX2R-D7WH] (“In 2018, an estimated 1.8 
billion people worldwide purchase[d] goods online.  During the same year, global e-retail sales 
amounted to 2.8 trillion U.S. dollars and projections show a growth of up to 4.8 trillion U.S. 
dollars by 2021.”). 
2. See Boer Deng, People Identified Through Credit-Card Use Alone, DICTYNNA'S NET 
(Feb. 23, 2015, 5:58 PM), http://dictynnasnet.blogspot.com/2015/02/people-identified-through-
credit-card.html [https://perma.cc/LD3J-LRLG] (reporting on a study finding that identifying 
information could be found in credit-card metadata); see also Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 
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often transmit personal payment data to the business vendor.3  This 
typically includes debit or credit card information consisting of a sixteen-
digit account number, card expiration date, and the three-digit card 
verification value (CVV) number located on the back of the card.4  It is 
important to note that the use of credit cards for consumer purchases 
greatly benefits merchants.  In addition to ease of use, studies have shown 
that consumers are willing to spend significantly more for items when 
using a credit card as opposed to cash.5  This information becomes 
particularly relevant due to the increasing news coverage regarding data 
theft as it has been extensive over the past several years, particularly after 
the Equifax data breach was made public in September 2017.6 
The completion of some commercial online transactions may require 
that more specific personally identifiable information be transmitted 
electronically to the business.  This includes the consumer’s date of birth, 
all or part of a social security number, annual income, consumer’s 
mother’s maiden name, and favorite pet’s name.7 
This online relationship benefits both the consumer and business 
entity by allowing time efficient and financially expeditious transactions 
without mailing costs or delays, paper transmittal and storage, and other 
 
984 N.E.2d 737, 743–44 (Mass. 2013) (finding the statutory definition of personal identification 
information “explicitly nonexhaustive”). 
3. See Miriam Caldwell, How a Debit Card Works, THE BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-debit-card-2385853 [https://perma.cc/WFP9-CWJN] 
(last updated May 8, 2019). 
4. See Privacy When You Pay: Credit, Debit, Cash and More, PRIVACY RTS. 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/privacy-when-you-pay-
credit-debit-cash-and-more [https://perma.cc/AED9-DXNN]. 
5. See Bailey Peterson, Credit Card Spending Studies (2018 Report): Why You Spend 
More When You Pay with a Credit Card, VALUEPENGUIN, https://www.valuepenguin.com/
credit-cards/credit-card-spending-studies [https://perma.cc/N639-KUYG]. 
6. Although reported in September 2017, the breach actually occurred in May 2017, 
exposing the data of over 143 million people.  Many commentators saw this breach as 
particularly damaging since Equifax is a consumer credit reporting agency that collects and 
aggregates information of over 800 million individual consumers and more than eighty-eight 
million businesses worldwide.  See Lee Mathews, Equifax Data Breach Impacts 143 Million 
Americans, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2017, 10:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/
2017/09/07/equifax-data-breach-impacts-143-million-americans/#53d7ca59356f 
[https://perma.cc/AL87-XSW6]. 
7. See Online Shopping Tips, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/online-shopping-tips [https://perma.cc/RY4L-
UTBN] (last updated Nov. 7, 2018); see also How to Avoid Giving Away Your Personal Details 
Online, U. BRISTOL, http://www.bristol.ac.uk/infosec/protectyou/how-to-avoid-giving-away-
your-personal-details-online/ [https://perma.cc/78ZA-YC7S] (explaining the types of 
information that many websites use as security questions and how to protect your data online). 
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human processing efficiencies and costs.8  Although the increased 
transmission of online data has allowed businesses to improve efficiency 
and profitability, the massive amounts of personal and financial data 
transmitted and stored by businesses have created significant 
opportunities for data thieves.9  Those able to illegally acquire and 
monetize consumer data are then able to commit crimes using this data, 
without a physical weapon or presence and often across state or national 
geographical borders.  Accordingly, these crimes are very low risk to 
commit, as local and state law enforcement often lack the technological 
tools needed to identify the suspects.  Further, even if the suspects and 
their location were identified, lack of resources and jurisdictional 
restrictions often prevent prosecution.10  Although the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the United States Secret Service have tools and 
resources more capable of identifying and prosecuting cyber-criminals, 
the amount stolen from an individual is often too small to trigger a federal 
investigation.11 
Improper data storage and the resulting data theft have exposed 
enormous amounts of consumer data to unintended third parties, 
ultimately resulting in billions of dollars in losses.12  In addition to the 
recent Equifax breach, significant personal data has also been stolen from 
Yahoo (three billion accounts were compromised in a 2013 attack),13 eBay 
(145 million accounts were compromised in 2014),14 JP Morgan Chase 
 
8. See Katherine Rengel, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Internet 
Accessibility for the Blind, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 543, 544 (2008). 
9. See Brittain Ladd, Amazon, Target, Walmart and Kroger: The Biggest Problem in E-
Commerce Has Finally Been Solved, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2018, 7:16 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brittainladd/2018/09/18/amazon-target-walmart-and-kroger-the-
biggest-problem-in-e-commerce-has-finally-been-solved/#50562e7f9ad7 [https://perma.cc/
3MW2-UGA8] (“By 2021, e-commerce sales globally are estimated to reach $4.8 trillion.  For 
a frame of reference, in 2017, Amazon delivered over 5 billion packages just for Prime 
members.  In a word, e-commerce is a massive enterprise and it’s only getting larger.”). 
10. See Nick Selby, Local Police Don’t Go After Most Cybercriminals. We Need Better 
Training, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/
2017/04/21/local-police-dont-go-after-most-cybercriminals-we-need-better-training/
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6ac96f3c91e6. 
11. Id. (“[C]ybercrime only becomes ‘serious’ around $200,000 of loss.”). 
12. See Herb Weisbaum, Data Breaches Cost Consumers Billions of Dollars, TODAY 
(June 5, 2013, 12:37 PM), https://www.today.com/money/data-breaches-cost-consumers-
billions-dollars-6C10209538 [https://perma.cc/8A3C-4QX5]. 
13. Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013 Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack-3-billion-
users.html [https://perma.cc/N95R-P6FX]. 
14. Andrea Peterson, eBay Asks 145 Million Users to Change Passwords After Data 
Breach, WASH. POST (May 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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(seventy-six million household accounts and seven million small business 
accounts were compromised in 2014),15 and Anthem Blue Cross Blue 
Shield (up to eighty million records were compromised).16 
Based on the demand for increased online transactions, from both 
consumers demanding convenience and business entities pursuing 
economic efficiencies, the growth of online data transmission is predicted 
to continue for many years.17  Accordingly, so too will the occurrences of 
data theft.18  Based on the scope of information obtained by businesses in 
online transactions, it is not surprising that when a data breach occurs, the 
resulting theft can have devastating and long-lasting consequences for the 
consumer victim.19  Unchecked data theft poses a risk to the trust and 




15. Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., JPMorgan Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million 
Households, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:50 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/ [https://perma.cc/XLR5-
BZHT]. 
16. Lauren Sporck, 11 of the Largest Data Breaches of All Time (Updated), OPSWAT: 
BLOG (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.opswat.com/blog/11-largest-data-breaches-all-time-
updated [https://perma.cc/N5MZ-ZA7D].  For a comprehensive overview of cybercrime, see Al 
Pascual et al., 2018 Identity Fraud: Fraud Enters a New Era of Complexity, JAVELIN (Feb. 6, 
2018), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2018-identity-fraud-fraud-enters-new-
era-complexity [https://perma.cc/EFZ8-9A5L] (“[C]riminals are engaging in complex identity 
fraud schemes that are leaving record numbers of victims in their wake. . . .  In 2017, there were 
16.7 million victims of identity fraud, a record high that followed a previous record the year 
before.”).  “The amount stolen hit $16.8 billion last year as 30 percent of U.S. consumers were 
notified [of their] exposure to a data breach last year, an increase of 12 percent from 2016.  For 
the first time, more Social Security numbers were exposed than credit card numbers.”  Facts + 
Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-
statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime [https://perma.cc/WVU7-6F82]. 
17. Fareeha Ali, U.S. Ecommerce Sales Grow 15.0% in 2018, DIGITAL COMMERCE 360, 
https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/us-ecommerce-sales/ [https://perma.cc/GU3K-
8CHG] (last updated Mar. 13, 2019). 
18. See Michael Wood, With an Increase in Online Shopping, Prepare for an Increase in 
Data Breaches, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2018, 12:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/
2018/02/24/with-an-increase-in-online-shopping-prepare-for-an-increase-in-data-breaches/
#74a98e7ce67b [https://perma.cc/AWG9-7ES9]. 
19. See EQUIFAX, A LASTING IMPACT: THE EMOTIONAL TOLL OF IDENTITY THEFT 1–2 
(2015), https://www.equifax.com/assets/PSOL/15-9814_psol_emotionalToll_wp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8AQN-VW6V]. 
20. Tracy Sharp et al., Exploring the Psychological and Somatic Impact of Identity Theft, 
49 J. FORENSIC SCI. 131, 131 (2004). 
The majority of [identity theft victims] expressed an increase in maladaptive 
psychological and somatic symptoms post victimization.  Results on the BSI 
indicated that identity theft victims with unresolved cases, in contrast to those with 
resolved cases, were more likely to have clinically elevated scores when compared 
with a normative sample.  Relatively similar coping mechanisms were utilized 
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both expansion of current and creation of new federal and state laws that 
will empower consumers to have a cause of action and directly hold 
businesses accountable for damages (including the psychological harm 
associated with data theft) for improper storage of data and data theft.  
This would be achieved by: (i) leveraging and expanding existing state 
consumer protection laws; (ii) more freely utilizing common law remedies 
(such as fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of 
contract); (iii) expanding the FTC to include a private cause of action; and 
(iv) modifying federal laws to better empower consumers (such as EFTA 
and Regulation-E) or enacting new legislation that requires the holder of 
consumer personal data to safely store, transmit, and destroy all data in a 
manner reasonably consistent with industry standards, of which 
consumers will have a specific cause of action in which they can sue for 
damages individually or as part of a class action, if a violation thereof 
occurs.  This will incentivize business entities to significantly improve 
data security, which, in turn, will reduce data theft-related crimes. 
This Article will analyze data breaches and identity theft, address 
existing laws and their flaws, and finally propose a solution.  Part I will 
seek to identify the separate, although related, issues of data breach and 
identity theft.  It will define key terms and seek to explain how data is 
stolen and how criminals use that data to commit identity theft.  Part II 
will explore current laws and remedies as they relate to privacy and data 
protection.  It will seek to draw parallels between current federal, state, 
and international laws.  Part III will propose a way forward, focusing 
specifically on what is lacking in current legal solutions and proposing a 
more appropriate legal remedy drawn from consumer protection laws. 
I. DATA BREACH AND IDENTITY THEFT—IDENTIFYING TWO DISTINCT 
PROBLEMS 
This Part of the Article seeks to provide an overview of how data 
breaches occur and how thieves illegally monetize stolen data.  It will 
explore several important definitions to establish a background for readers 
on data, breaches, damages, and the internet.  It will also explain how 
hackers use a hidden part of the internet to buy and sell personal 
information. 
 
across victims.  The results from this study suggest that victims of identity theft do 
have increased psychological and physical distress, and for those whose cases 
remain unresolved, distress is maintained over time. 
Id. 
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A. Defining Data 
Often confused for one another, “data breach”21 and “identity theft”22 
are terms that, although interrelated, are distinct.23  In terms of our 
discussion regarding data breaches, this Article defines “data” broadly, 
representing any electronic transmissions which could be used 
individually or collectively to identify information regarding the status of 
a person’s identity, finances, healthcare, education, or any other 
information in which there is a reasonable expectation that it will be kept 
private and not be publicly disclosed or shared with any unrelated third 
party.  In turn, “data breach” means “the loss, theft, or other unauthorized 
access, other than those incidental to the scope of employment, to data 
containing sensitive personal information, in electronic or printed form, 
that results in the potential compromise of the confidentiality or integrity 
of the data.”24  Data breaches can originate from many sources and with 
varying degrees of malicious intent.  Common examples include: 
• Co-workers unintentionally including an attachment 
containing personal data to an email. 
• Due to outdated software by a medical billing office, medical 
records are accessed by a hacker. 
• Bank employees send unencrypted emails containing 
customers’ financial data. 
• An employee unintentionally opens a file containing 
malware, which in turn transmits client data to a third-party 
criminal.  
• An attorney opens a file at home using their unsecure personal 
computer. 
• A data host has failed to update their security software, thus 
permitting data to be stolen by a third party. 
 
21. “A data breach is a security violation in which sensitive, protected or confidential data 
is copied, transmitted, viewed, stolen or used by an individual unauthorized to do so.”  ADMIN. 
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LOG NO. ACYF-CB-
IM-15-04, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
cb/im1504.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SRJ-R8VQ]. 
22. “Identity theft” is defined as “the illegal use of someone else’s personal information 
(such as a Social Security number) especially in order to obtain money or credit.”  Identity Theft, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity%20theft 
[https://perma.cc/4U9Q-42DZ]. 
23. See Brandon Ferrick, Comment, No Harm, No Foul: The Fourth Circuit Struggles 
with the “Injury-in-Fact” Requirement to Article III Standing in Data Breach Class Actions, 
59 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 462, 462 (2018) (explaining that, after a data breach, two of 
the most common harms cited in lawsuits are identity theft and increased risk of identity 
theft). 
24. Veterans’ Benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 5727(4) (2019) (defining “data breach”). 
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• A manufacturing executive loses a company laptop 
containing company trade secrets. 
When data is improperly exposed, it is at risk of being taken by an 
unauthorized third party and also being used to the detriment of the data 
originator. 
B. Defining Data Breach 
While one may find it troubling to discover that his or her personal 
data was exposed in a data breach, the exposure may become more serious 
if the data is then subsequently used in an identity theft crime.  Identity 
theft primarily occurs when cybercriminals obtain information from a data 
breach and then use it to apply for loans and credit, commit fraud, 
withdraw money, make unauthorized purchases, or otherwise leverage the 
information to financially benefit the criminal.25  Akin to being the victim 
of a data breach, identity theft can cause significant psychological harm 
to a victim, as well as financial loss.26  Although not all data breaches 
result in identity theft, the fact that compromised information is available 
to unauthorized third parties can cause significant anxiety and indefinite 
concern.27 
Despite enhanced efforts to combat identity theft, the “2017 Identity 
Fraud Study, released by Javelin Strategy [and] Research, found that $16 
billion was stolen from 15.4 million U.S. consumers in 2016, compared 
with $15.3 billion [stolen from] 13.1 million victims a year earlier.  In the 
past six years, identity thieves have stolen over $107 billion.”28 
 
25. See Warning Signs of Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2015), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0271-warning-signs-identity-theft [https://perma.cc/
FFS3-3A93]; Al Pascual et al., 2017 Identity Fraud: Securing the Connected Life, JAVELIN 
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2017-identity-fraud 
[https://perma.cc/3F8J-NFKY].  In 2016, 6.15% of consumers became victims of identity 
fraud.  Pascual et al., supra.  Criminals are increasingly moving online, demonstrated by 
growth in existing card fraud, which saw a significant spike in card-not-present transactions 
(CNP).  See id. 
26. From the author’s experience as a bankruptcy practitioner, it is not uncommon for an 
individual to file bankruptcy due in part because of debts on their account incurred by 
someone who has stolen their identity. 
27. Ferrick, supra note 23, at 480 (explaining that there may not be a legal claim for 
individuals whose data has been compromised, but whose identities have yet to be stolen, 
increasing anxiety for these individuals, with no legal remedy). 
28. Reuben Jackson, Finding Ways to Protect Your Online ID Through Blockchain 
Innovation, NASDAQ (Mar. 9, 2018, 9:47:28 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/finding-
ways-to-protect-your-online-id-through-blockchain-innovation-cm932475; see Pascual et al., 
supra note 25; see also Identity Fraud Hits Record High with 15.4 Million U.S. Victims in 
2016, Up 16 Percent According to New Javelin Strategy & Research Study, JAVELIN (Feb. 1, 
2017), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/press-release/identity-fraud-hits-record-high-154-
 
260 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:253 
C. Defining Data Breach “Damages” 
Another obstacle consumers face in seeking redress is the lack of 
quantifiable and speculative damages.29  It is important to note that even 
if the data is not ultimately used in a manner that results in direct economic 
harm to the data originator, even the mere knowledge of the breach can 
cause psychological harm for the victim for years to come due to the 
anxiety and concern about the use of the data in the future.30  Following a 
data breach, the electronic nature of the data means it is available to 
criminals in perpetuity, and therefore, it is possible that the concern of 
ongoing psychological harm to the victim may also exist in perpetuity.  
Courts may require that victims suffer a harm before being able to seek 
redress, but those same statutes do not define harm.31  Harm can occur in 
many forms ranging from easily quantifiable harm, such as specific 
amounts of money traceable directly to an identity theft, to harms that are 
difficult to quantify, such as the anxiety and fear of a potential future theft, 
even if there have been no funds yet stolen.32  As stated by Daniel J. 
Solove and Danielle Keats Citron in their article Risk and Anxiety: A 
Theory on Data Breach Harms: 
The law offers a set of tools that can be used to address harm, from 
compensatory damages to equitable relief (such as injunctions) to 
remedies (such as unjust enrichment). 
Our legal system needs to confront data-breach harms because 
real costs are borne by individuals and society and because ignoring 
them results in inefficient deterrence.  Courts routinely avoid hard 
questions and ignore the anxiety people experience and the increased 
risk that data breaches cause.  Yet in other areas of the law, courts have 
recognized such harms and placed manageable limits on their reach.  
As we have shown, those legal developments should inform how 
courts address data-breach harms.  A path has been laid to help us 
work through the complexities of data-breach harms. 
 
million-us-victims-2016-16-percent-according-new [https://perma.cc/KZB4-QM8U] 
(illustrating yearly losses in the table titled “Fraud Losses”). 
29. See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).  In Clapper, 
Plaintiffs challenged a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that 
created new procedures for authorizing government electronic surveillance of non-U.S. 
persons outside the U.S. for foreign intelligence purposes.  Id. at 402–04.  The Court held that 
the respondents did not have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because no 
injury had yet occurred.  Id. at 422. 
30. See Ferrick, supra note 23, at 475–80 (discussing the circuit split on actual harm of a 
data breach and the legal strategy of arguing imminent damage). 
31. See id. at 462–63. 
32. See id. 
 
2019] PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR VICTIMS OF DATA BREACHES 261 
Data-breach harm might often be intangible, but it still is very 
real.  Data harm is frequently risk-oriented, but risk management is a 
standard part of the way that the modern commercial world operates.33 
In Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that under chapter 93, section 105 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws,34 a plaintiff can pursue a cause of action even if no actual 
identity fraud occurred.35  In Tyler, the consumer made purchases at 
Michaels, a crafts supply store, using a credit card.36  During the credit 
card transaction, an employee asked Tyler for her zip code.  Tyler, 
assuming the transmittal of her zip code was required to complete the 
transaction, gave the employee her zip code.37  The data sought was not 
required by the credit card holder, but rather was requested as part of an 
internal policy of Michaels in which it recorded information about 
customers who engaged in credit transactions, including their names, zip 
codes, and credit card numbers.38  Accordingly, Michaels was able to 
access Tyler’s address and phone number after she gave the cashier her 
name and zip code.39  Michaels’s then also sent unsolicited marketing 
materials.40  The trial court ultimately found Tyler’s complaint against 
Michaels failed as there was no cognizable injury for collecting zip code 
information under chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws.41  The 
court went on to hold: 
 
33. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data 
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 785 (2018). 
34. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 105(b) (2018) prohibits a vendor from requiring a credit 
card holder to include additional identifying data on their credit transaction form as 
follows: 
No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity accepting a check 
in any business or commercial transaction as payment in full or in part for goods 
or services shall do any of the following:  
(1) Require, as a condition of acceptance of such check, that the person presenting 
such check provide a credit card number, or any personal identification 
information other than a name, address, motor vehicle operator license number or 
state identification card number of such person and telephone number, all of which 
may be recorded 
. . . . 
(4) Require, as a condition of acceptance of the check, that a person’s credit card 
number be recorded in connection with any part of a transaction. 
Id. 
35. Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 747 (Mass. 2013). 
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Returning to [section] 105(a), there appear to be at least two types 
of injury or harm that might in theory be caused by a merchant’s 
violation of the statute: the actual receipt by a consumer of unwanted 
marketing materials as a result of the merchant’s unlawful collection 
of the consumer’s personal identification information; and the 
merchant’s sale of a customer’s personal identification information or 
the data obtained from that information to a third party.  When a 
merchant acquires personal identification information in violation of 
[section] 105(a) and uses the information for its own business 
purposes, whether by sending the customer unwanted marketing 
materials or by selling the information for a profit, the merchant has 
caused the consumer an injury that is distinct from the statutory 
violation itself and cognizable under [chapter 93A, section 9].42 
In Katz v. Pershing, LLC, the Massachusetts Court again contended 
with the difficulty of determining whether adequate damages exist.  In 
Katz, a Massachusetts brokerage firm used software that permitted its 
clients’ personal information to be disclosed to unauthorized third parties 
in violation of Massachusetts law.43  The court ultimately granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
ruling that the plaintiff did “not allege that any of her [personal 
information] ha[d] been lost, stolen, disclosed, or accessed by an 
unauthorized person.”44  The court agreed with the defendant that “any 
potential injury that [the plaintiff] might suffer at some point in the future 
because of a misappropriation of her [personal information] is far too 
speculative to satisfy standing requirements; therefore, [the plaintiff] has 
failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.”45 
Even if victims are able to demonstrate injury-in-fact, they also face 
challenges based on standing, as state statutes only empower the State 
Attorney General to file suit.46  For example, the plaintiffs in Katz v. 
Pershing, LLC brought their suit personally (i.e., it was not a government 
entity that brought the suit), and they did not seek redress under any data 
protection statute but merely brought their claim as a breach of contract.47  
In addition, as the Katz plaintiffs did not allege any actual harm suffered 
from the misuse of their data, the court might have been more willing to 
allow their common law claim to proceed had a quantifiable harm 
 
42. Id. at 746 (footnotes omitted). 
43. See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, No. 10-12227-RGS, 2011 WL 1113198, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Mar. 28, 2011). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 4 (2018) (giving the Attorney General authority to 
bring action in Superior Court for violations of this law). 
47. Id. 
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occurred.  Based on this case, in conjunction with other state case law, 
Massachusetts courts are reluctant to allow lawsuits if actual harm is not 
pled.48 
D. How Stolen Data Is Monetized—The “Dark Web”49 
In most cases of data breach, criminals will seek to monetize data 
using illegal means.50  When personal information is stolen through data 
breaches, the victims begin to be proactively protective of their 
information.  Victims employ credit-checking safeguards, complex dark 
web scans, and a host of other defensive mechanisms to try to protect their 
identities—however the cyber-sleuths that plunder major corporations are 
patient. 
Stolen data can be held by thieves for years and then uploaded onto 
dark web message boards that function as an online sales site.  To 
understand how this process works, an understanding of the functionality 
of the internet is necessary.  The internet is effectively broken up into three 
layers.  The first layer is the “surface web,” which is the web interface 
most users are familiar with when using a popular web search browser, 
such as Google or Yahoo.51  However, there is a more secretive part of the 
internet that most users unwittingly encounter.  This second layer is called 
the “deep web.”52  This portion of the internet can be categorized as 
anything that search engines do not catalog.53  When users log in to check 
their bank balance, they have entered the deep web.  When users log into 
a secure database, such as Westlaw or LexisNexis, they have also entered 
the deep web.  These websites have been coded to prevent access from the 
web crawlers that search engines use to index the internet.54 
 
48. See, e.g., Urman v. S. Bos. Sav. Bank, 674 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Mass. 1997) (holding 
that the threat of future harm is not recoverable as tort damages). 
49. The Authors have decided to limit the scope of their explanation of how data is 
stolen and monetized on the “dark web” to avoid creating a “how-to” guide for would-be 
nefarious readers. 
50. See generally Data Thieves: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism and Illicit 
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Lillian Ablon, 
Information Scientist, The RAND Corporation), available at https://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT490/RAND_CT490.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWL2-
RKKU] [hereinafter Data Thieves] (explaining the different types of actors and how they steal 
and monetize data). 
51. Definition of: Surface Web, PC, https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/52273/
surface-web [https://perma.cc/Y2G7-JUYH]. 
52. Definition of: Deep Web, PC, https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/41069/
deep-web [https://perma.cc/4SRP-8EUR]. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
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Below the deep web is the so-called “dark web”—the third and final 
layer of the internet.  This is the portion of the internet used by hackers, 
drug dealers, and internet scammers.55  The dark web has forums that 
allow members to discuss strategies and provide effective tutorials for 
others starting in the world of hacking.  It also has marketplaces dedicated 
to buying and selling software, counterfeit currency, drugs, and—of 
course—identities,56 which can range from hacked accounts to forged 
passports.  While these offerings may not be entirely verifiable within 
legal means, they are relatively easy to find.  To access these “dark” 
corners of the internet, one needs only the right internet browser. 
The Onion Routing Project, commonly known as Tor, is the most 
commonly used browser to access the dark web.57  It works much like any 
other internet browser, but instead of relaying one’s request directly to the 
website server, it sends a user’s connection through a vast network of 
volunteer servers to disguise where the request came from and where it is 
going.  This allows some degree of anonymity while browsing the web.58  
Tor also encrypts all transmissions, so even if one’s browsing was 
discovered, it would need to be decrypted to be understood.59 
Tor is often used for political dissidents in totalitarian regimes.60  
Specifically, in Tor, there are many tools and websites with a dedicated 
purpose of allowing whistle-blowers to disseminate classified information 
directly to reporters.61  The encryption system also allows users to browse 
more privately than traditional internet browsers.62  The Navy uses Tor for 
intelligence gathering, and law enforcement agencies use it for 
surveillance and sting operations.63  In fact, the Tor project was originally 
created by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory to protect U.S. intelligence 
 
55. See Definition of: Dark Web, PC, https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/
67980/dark-web [https://perma.cc/WX9P-X88H]. 
56. See Max Eddy, Inside the Dark Web, PC (Feb. 4, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.pcmag.com/article/331580/inside-the-dark-web [https://perma.cc/T3PZ-EQS4]. 
57. See generally About: History, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/history/ 
[https://perma.cc/AWM6-YG49]. 
58. See id. 
59. Id. (“The goal of onion routing was to have a way to use the internet with as much 
privacy as possible, and the idea was to route traffic through multiple servers and encrypt it 
each step of the way.”). 
60. Alkira Reinfrank, What is the ‘Dark Web’? Term Made Famous by Ashley Madison 
and Paedophile Rings Explained, ABC: NEWS (Aug. 28, 2015, 12:54 AM), 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-27/dark-web-dark-net-deep-web-paedophiles/6729916 
[https://perma.cc/ANY8-6X8C]. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. 
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communications on the internet.64  The Tor project is still largely funded 
by the United States Federal Government and has extremely important 
and legitimate uses.65 
However, it is still the last place one would want his or her personal 
information to end up.  With hacking tutorials and networks of illegal 
marketplaces, data breaches can lead to the theft and sale of thousands of 
users’ information before the user even notices.  Credit companies, 
therefore, have started programs to “scan” the dark web for individuals 
information.66  You may have seen commercials advertising a security 
company’s ability to monitor the dark web for individuals’ social security 
numbers.  While these safeguards exist, websites on the dark web come 
into and out of existence faster than can be tracked, and many of these 
websites sell services like stolen data and identities.67 
To understand the specific steps hackers take to monetize stolen data, 
an excerpt from the article, Once Stolen, What Do Hackers Do With Your 
Data?, concisely discusses the process as follows:  
Once an attack has happened and the criminal has your data, he 
or she likely runs through the following steps, which we like to call, 
“A Hacker’s Post Breach Checklist:” 
1. Inventory the stolen data—Hackers will look through the 
stolen data files for authentication credentials, personal information 
like names, addresses and phone numbers, and financial information 
like credit card details. 
2. Sell personal information—Next, the hacker will package up 
personal information like names, addresses, phone numbers, and email 
addresses and sell them, typically in bulk.  These are more valuable 
the more recent they are.  According to Quartz, a full set of someone’s 
personal information including identification number, address, 
birthdate, and possibly credit card info costs between $1 and $450 
with a media[n] cost of $21.35. 
3. Look for the good stuff—Hackers will then inventory 
authentication credentials further and look for potentially lucrative 
accounts.  Government and military addresses are very valuable, as 
well as company email addresses and passwords for large 
corporations.  Since people often re-use their passwords, hackers can 
 
64. JOSEPH BABATUNDE FAGOYINBO, THE ARMED FORCES: INSTRUMENT OF PEACE, 
STRENGTH, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY 262 (2013). 
65. See Yasha Levine, Almost Everyone Involved in Developing Tor Was (or Is) Funded 
by the US Government, PANDO (July 16, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/07/16/tor-spooks/ 
[https://perma.cc/63L9-MJ6A]. 
66. See, e.g., Is Your Information on the Dark Web?, EXPERIAN, 
https://www.experian.com/consumer-products/free-dark-web-email-scan.html 
[https://perma.cc/34XB-WJUW]. 
67. See Data Thieves, supra note 50, at 1. 
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often use credentials for military or corporate accounts to target other 
companies.  For example, Dropbox was breached in 2012 using 
credentials stolen in the LinkedIn data breach earlier that year.  A 
hacker may plan such a hack himself, or he/she may sell the 
credentials to others on the dark web for a much higher price. 
4. Offload the cards—Financial information like credit card 
numbers are packaged and sold in bundles.  An individual with the 
right knowledge could easily buy credit card information in groups of 
ten or a hundred.  Usually, a “broker” buys the card information, then 
sells them to a “carder” who goes through a shell game of purchases 
to avoid being detected.  First the “carders” use stolen credit card [sic] 
to buy gift cards to stores or to Amazon.com, then use those cards to 
buy physical items.  The carder may then sell the electronics through 
legitimate channels like eBay, or through an underground dark 
website. 
5. Sell in bulk—After several months, the hacker will bundle up 
authentication credentials and sell them in bulk at a discounted price.  
By now, most of the credentials are worthless since the company has 
most likely discovered the breach and taken steps to repair it.  For 
example, a database containing the entire LinkedIn credentials dump 
is still available.68 
E. The Significance of Data Theft 
Data theft touches many industries, and the cost of the losses 
continues to rise.  The 2018 Cost of Data Breach Study found that the 
average cost for each lost record is on the rise.69  The highest costs 
resulting from lost or stolen records were health care related data.70  In 
2017, sixteen large breaches occurred, which is much higher than the nine 
large breaches that occurred just four years previously in 2013.71  The 
study also confirmed what many believe to be obvious—the larger the 
breach, the higher the cost.72  After significant study, the Ponemon 
Institute made several findings regarding data breaches.  Specifically the 
Institute found that most breaches were caused by “malicious and criminal 
attacks” as opposed to human error, and it took, on average, 266 days from 
 
68. The Editor, Once Stolen, What Do Hackers Do With Your Data?, SECPLICITY (May 
18, 2017), https://www.secplicity.org/2017/05/18/stolen-hackers-data/ [https://perma.cc/X26J-
D8HS]. 
69. PONEMON INST., LLC, 2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL OVERVIEW 
3–4 (2018), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/861MNWN2 [https://perma.cc/ZV6H-
QW6V]. 
70. Id. at 18 fig.7. 
71. See generally PONEMON INST., LLC, 2013 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL 
ANALYSIS (2013), https://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2013%20Report%20GLOBAL
%20CODB%20FINAL%205-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZT2-NALN]. 
72. See PONEMON INST., LLC, supra note 69, at 39. 
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detection of the breach to containment.73  In addition, those breaches that 
affected one million records cost the company about $40 million dollars, 
whereas a breach involving 50 million records cost the company 
approximately $350 million dollars.74 
II. EXISTING DATA PROTECTION LAWS AND REGULATIONS—A 
PATCHWORK OF UNORGANIZED REMEDIES 
Although a comprehensive national data protection law that provides 
individual consumers with rights and remedies against negligent data 
holders would be ideal, consumers are currently forced to navigate their 
way through a patchwork of various state and federal laws that ultimately 
provide limited protection.  A survey of existing data protection laws 
follows. 
A. Federal Data Protection Laws 
Surprisingly, unlike recent significant data protection legislation in 
Europe,75 a comprehensive federal privacy law in the United States is 
lacking.  Although Congress has contemplated nationalized legislation 
that would create a uniform system of data regulation, legislation has 
failed to pass thus far.76  As such, state and local lawmakers have been 
forced to try and tackle this exceptionally complex issue.  However, as the 
participants in the crime are often located in different states (and 
sometimes countries), the effectiveness of local laws is minimized.  In 
response, industry groups have also attempted to address the issue by 
agreeing on guidelines and best practices and urging the U.S. Congress to 
adopt a federal standard.77  Although these mechanisms do not have the 
force of law, they are at least an attempt to voluntary achieve compliance 
with heightened data protection within various industries. 
The federal privacy-related laws that do regulate the collection and 
use of personal data are fragmented, and each law primarily pertains to a 
particular sector of industry, including: (i) laws that regulate consumer 
 
73. Id. at 4, 19–21. 
74. Id. at 4. 
75. See generally Griffin Drake, Note, Navigating the Atlantic: Understanding EU Data 
Privacy Compliance Amidst a Sea of Uncertainty, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 163 (2017) (providing a 
robust discussion of the EU General Data Protection Regulation). 
76. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-
approach-data-protection [https://perma.cc/LH63-9P7K]. 
77. Danielle Abril, This is What Tech Companies Want in Any Federal Data Privacy 
Legislation, FORTUNE (Feb. 21, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/02/21/technology-companies-
federal-data-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/NZ63-MEE4]. 
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data maintained by insurance and financial institutions;78 (ii) laws that 
regulate consumer data maintained by medical and other healthcare 
providers;79 and (iii) laws that regulate consumer data maintained by 
telecommunication companies, including those that telemarket and 
engage in commercial e-mail.80  Furthermore, consumer protection laws 
designed to prohibit unfair and deceptive commercial practices are being 
used to hold companies accountable.81 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA)82 is a broad federal 
consumer protection law that holds businesses accountable for “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”83  The FTCA, initially enacted in 1914,84 has 
more recently been applied to policies surrounding privacy and data 
security.85  Companies that fail to adequately safeguard personal 
information and data have been subject to Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) investigation and prosecution.86  For example, in FTC v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., due to unfair and deceptive practices, the FTC sued a 
hotel chain for failing to adequately safeguard their customers’ personal 
information.87  In first addressing a jurisdictional issue, the court held the 
FTC, under the FTCA’s prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices, had authority to regulate companies failing to ensure that their 
consumers’ personal information was reasonably and appropriately 
secured, even though Congress had enacted other statutes that concerned 
data security.88  In addition, the FTC’s authority over data security could 
coexist with existing data-security regulatory schemes.89 
Equally important to safeguarding against unfair and deceptive acts, 
the FTC also ensures compliance with the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA),90 which regulates the collection of data and 
 
78. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018). 
79. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2018). 
80. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2018). 
81. See In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 990 (N.D. Cal. 
2016) (utilizing the FTCA, a consumer protection law, in a case arising out of a data breach). 
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58. 
83. Id. § 45(a)(1). 
84. See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, 
and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (noting the passage of the FTCA in 1914). 
85. See In re Anthem, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d at 990 (applying the FTC to a data breach 
claim). 
86. See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 259 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(holding that Wyndham had violated the law by failing to safeguard user information). 
87. Id. at 240–41. 
88. See id. at 243–49. 
89. See id. at 248. 
90. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2018). 
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information from children.  It is also important to note that the FTCA does 
not allow for a private cause of action.91 
The Financial Services Modernization Act,92 otherwise known as the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), was primarily drafted to allow 
companies from different financial industries, such as banks, insurance 
companies, and securities firms to merge.93  However, the GLBA also 
contains some important components regarding the collection, use, and 
disclosure of financial information.  Specifically, non-public personal 
information is regulated and limited.94  In addition, financial institutions 
are required to notify customers of their privacy practices and give 
customers an opportunity to opt out of having some of their information 
shared.95  Although a significant and powerful regulation, the GLBA, 
unfortunately, provides no private cause of action recognized by courts.96 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
regulates medical information and is applied broadly to a variety of 
entities that encounter medical information, which encompasses health 
care providers, data processors, and pharmacies.97  HIPAA was drafted 
 
91. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n).  See generally Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the 
Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 
437 (1991) (discussing private causes of action created by state law, their benefits, drawbacks, 
and foundation in the FTCA). 
92. Financial Services Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809; 6821–6827 (2018) 
(containing sections of the Financial Services Modernization Act, also referred to as the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
93. See Joe Mahon, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Commonly Called 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 12, 1999), 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gramm_leach_bliley_act [https://perma.cc/
VXB4-PXJY] (discussing the impact of the repeal of Glass-Stegall on the allowance of 
mergers). 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a). 
95. Id. 
96. See In re French, 401 B.R. 295, 309 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009).  In French, a 
bankruptcy debtor’s social security number and date of birth were improperly included on a 
proof of claim filed by a creditor.  As this information becomes publicly available once the 
proof of claim is filed, the debtor brought an action against the creditor for a variety of claims, 
including violation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act.  Following the 
creditor’s motion to dismiss, the court declared: “By its very terms, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act does not provide a private right of action.”  Id. at 310 (citing Dunmire v. Morgan Stanley 
DW, Inc., 475 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2007) (“No private right of action exists for an alleged 
violation of the GLBA.”); Farley v. Williams, No. 02-CV-0667C(SR), 2005 WL 3579060, at 
*3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2005) (“[A] private right of action does not exist on behalf of an 
individual . . . claiming harm as the result of a financial institution’s failure to comply with the 
GLBA’s privacy provisions.”); Southhall v. Check Depot, Inc., No. 07-001115-TOM-13, 
2008 WL 5330001, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala., Dec. 19, 2008) (“Courts have consistently held 
that there is no private cause of action created by Congress in the GLBA.”)). 
97. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of title 18, 26, 29, and 42 of the 
U.S.C.). 
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broadly and covers many aspects of consumer privacy.  The Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information regulate the 
storage and use of protected health information.98  The Security Rule 
provides standards for protecting medical data.99  The Standards for 
Electronic Transactions applies to the electronic transmission of medical 
data.100  Although HIPPA creates an expansive list of protections, again, 
no private cause of action exists for an individual to bring suit for violation 
of the statute.101 
Despite the lack of a private cause of action for claims filed under 
HIPPA, the majority of courts that have considered the privacy issue have 
concluded that there is a common law duty of confidentiality arising from 
the physician-patient relationship.102  Courts have relied on the fact that 
there was a public policy justification arising out of the duty of 
confidentiality between a patient and physician.103  Other courts have held 
 
98. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, OFF. 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION (July 6, 2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/
standards-privacy-individually-identifiable-health-information [https://perma.cc/Q7PJ-
WFHB] [hereinafter Standards for Privacy]. 
99. See The Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html [https://perma.cc/GX4N-
2PCE]. 
100. 45 C.F.R. §§ 162.1601–03 (2000); Standards for Privacy, supra note 98. 
101. Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006).  In Acara, the plaintiff sued 
their doctor for violating HIPPA after disclosing unauthorized information during a 
deposition.  Id. at 570.  When evaluating if a federal statute provides a private cause of action, 
the court must evaluate the intent of language of the statute.  The court held that 
[w]hile no other circuit court has specifically addressed this issue, we are not alone 
in our conclusion that Congress did not intend for private enforcement of HIPAA.  
Every district court that has considered this issue is in agreement that the statute 
does not support a private right of action. 
 Furthermore, Acara provides no authority to support her assertion that a private 
right of action exists under HIPAA, and her policy arguments are unpersuasive.  
We hold there is no private cause of action under HIPAA and therefore no federal 
subject matter jurisdiction over Acara’s asserted claims. 
Id. at 571–72 (citations omitted). 
102. See, e.g., Brandt v. Med. Def. Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667, 669–71 (Mo. 1993) 
(explaining the duty of confidentiality owed to a patient by a physician). 
103. See Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 175 A.3d 1, 7 (Conn. 
2018); see also Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 119 (Mass. 1985) (“The courts that have 
imposed on physicians a duty of confidentiality and have recognized a cause of action to 
enforce that duty have grounded their decisions on the determination that public policy favors 
the protection of a patient’s right to confidentiality.”); Aufrichtig v. Lowell, 650 N.E.2d 401, 
404 (N.Y. 1995); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 439 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). 
[T]he [l]egislature has demonstrated its recognition of a policy favoring 
confidentiality of medical facts by enacting [statutes] . . . to limit the availability 
of hospital records.  Furthermore, [the legislature has also] create[d] an evidentiary 
privilege as to confidential communications between a psychotherapist and a 
patient.  The fact that no such statutory privilege obtains with respect to physicians 
generally and their patients does not dissuade us from declaring that in this 
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that state common law causes of action compliment HIPAA.104  A 
minority of courts, however, have refused to recognize a cause of action 
for the breach of a confidential or privileged relationship in the absence 
of statutory authority.105 
Both consumer reporting agencies and agencies providing consumer-
reporting information (including lenders and credit card companies) are 
accountable for user privacy under The Fair Credit Reporting Act and the 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act—which amended the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act.106  Consumer reports are the  
communication of any information by a consumer reporting 
agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit 
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
 
Commonwealth all physicians owe their patients a duty, for violation of which the 
law provides a remedy, not to disclose without the patient’s consent medical 
information about the patient, except to meet a serious danger to the patient or to 
others. 
Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d at 119 (citation omitted). 
104. Crescenzo v. Crane, 796 A.2d 283, 284–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) 
(allowing the plaintiff’s complaint to proceed against her physician when he responded to a 
subpoena by disclosing medical records without notice or authorization in violation of 
common law); see Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (“[A]n 
independent tort exists for the unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of 
nonpublic medical information that a physician or hospital has learned within a physician-
patient relationship.”); see also Sorensen v. Barbuto, 143 P.3d 295, 300 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) 
(“[E]x parte communication between a physician and opposing counsel constitutes a breach of 
the physician’s fiduciary duty of confidentiality.”).  The Sorenson court further determined 
that “the trial court erred in dismissing [the plaintiff’s] claim for breach of confidentiality” and 
“determin[ing] that a duty exists, [ruled that] the trial court [also] erred in dismissing [the 
plaintiff’s] claim for negligence.”  Id. at 301. 
105. Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591, 599 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (refusing to follow cases 
from other states and declining to recognize cause of action for breach of confidential or 
privileged relationship because no Missouri case had recognized a cause of action before), 
aff’d, 716 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1983); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322, 324 (S.D. Ga. 1957) 
(citation omitted) (“There is no confidential relationship between doctor and patient or 
hospital and patient in Georgia.”); Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249, 251–52 (Tenn. 
1965) (declining to recognize cause of action for breach of confidentiality where state had no 
common-law or statutory privilege for communications between patient and physician); see 
Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (D.D.C. 1978).  In Logan, the court 
held: 
Other jurisdictions have recognized a cause of action for unauthorized disclosure 
of information obtained through the physician-patient relationship.  The plaintiff, 
however, has not persuaded this court that such a cause of action should or would 
be recognized by the courts of this jurisdiction.  Further, the plaintiff’s invasion of 
privacy action is sufficient to redress any breach of the confidentiality of the 
physician-patient relationship. 
Id. 
106. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2018); Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (amending §§ 1681–
1681x). 
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characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to 
be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of 
serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for 
credit or insurance . . . .107 
B. Other Law and Guidelines 
When the personal information of certain allied-nation foreign 
citizens was improperly shared with law enforcement, Congress enacted 
redress in 2016 under the Judicial Redress Act.108  Further, there are many 
other federal information security and enforcement laws governing the use 
and control of personal information.109 
In addition to statutory laws, various industry groups (such as the 
payment cards, mobile marketing, and online advertising industries) have 
issued guidelines for their members based on best practices for their 
respective industries.110  Some industry groups, such as the advertising 
industry, have worked to develop their own rules for online advertising.111  
Essentially, this industry agreement requires cooperating members to 
 
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(A) (2018); see Longman v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 702 
F.3d 148, 149–50 (2nd Cir. 2012).  In Longman, the plaintiff filed an action against Wachovia 
for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act by making false reports to credit reporting 
agencies, and then failing to correct them after being told of the discrepancy by the consumer.  
The court held: 
Although we have not previously addressed whether the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
provides a private cause of action for violations of § 1681s–2(a), the statute plainly 
restricts enforcement of that provision to federal and state authorities.  Indeed, the 
statute provides that subsection (a) “shall be enforced exclusively . . . by the 
Federal agencies and officials and the State officials identified in section 1681s of 
this title.”  Thus, the district court correctly concluded, as many other courts have 
held, that there is no private cause of action for violations of § 1681s–2(a). 
Id. at 151 (citations omitted). 
108. Judicial Redress Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). 
109. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2018); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2018); CAN-
SPAM Act 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2018); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2018); 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2018); Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2018); Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018). 
110. For example, The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council mandates that 
credit card members comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard to reduce 
fraud.  See About Us, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about_us/ [https://perma.cc/84TQ-PVRB].  The 
International Association for Healthcare Security and Safety implemented guidelines that 
members must comply with in order to promote security.  See About Us, INT’L ASS’N FOR 
HEALTHCARE SECURITY & SAFETY, https://www.iahss.org/page/aboutus [https://perma.cc/
J5JH-TMN6]. 
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comply with group guidelines that resemble those of the FTC.112  Those 
industry members who comply with the voluntary guidelines are able to 
use a symbol on their advertisements to let others know they are 
compliant.113 
1. European Data Regulation 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was finally 
implemented in May 2018.114  It was one of the first major sweeping 
attempts at regulating European Union companies’ use of data that 
previously had been able to use consumers’ data with little restriction.115  
The GDPR is both broad in scope and deep in substance.  It provides 
significant protection for European consumers.116  Under the GDPR, if 
companies operating under its jurisdiction do not report security breaches 
to the government and consumers within seventy-two hours of becoming 
aware of the breach, or hold data for longer than is necessary, the company 
can face significant financial penalties.117  Specifically, the GDPR 
imposes the following restrictions and remedies on European companies: 
• Imposition of Significant Penalties.  Organizations in breach of 
GDPR can be fined up to twenty million euros or four percent of 
annual global turnover (whichever is greater).118 
• Consumer Consent.  When requesting data from a consumer, the 
request must include a request for consent in a simple and easily 
accessible form that explains the purpose for the data requested.  
The GDPR specifically states that the consent must use clear and 
 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See A New Era for Data Protection in the EU, EUR. COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/data-protection-factsheet-
changes_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N9V-FSCA]. 
115. See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119).  In describing the 
underlying principle of the law, the regulation defines data protection as follows: 
The processing of personal data should be designed to serve mankind.  The right 
to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered in 
relation to its function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights, 
in accordance with the principle of proportionality.  This Regulation respects all 
fundamental rights and observes the freedoms and principles recognised in the 
Charter as enshrined in the Treaties, in particular the respect for private and family 
life, home and communications, the protection of personal data, freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and information, freedom 
to conduct a business, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, and 
cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. 
Id. at 2. 
116. See id. at 1–2. 
117. See id. at 52, art. 33(1). 
118. Id. at 83, art. 83(6). 
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plain language and be distinguishable from other consent requests 
being simultaneously made.  Under GDPR, the consumer maintains 
the right to withdraw consent at any time.119 
• Consumer Notification of Data Breach.  Under the GDPR, breach 
notifications are mandatory and must be done within 72 hours of the 
company first having become aware of the breach, and data 
processors are also required to notify their customers, the 
controllers, “without undue delay” after first becoming aware of a 
data breach.120 
• Consumer’s Right to be “Forgotten”.  In addition to the right to 
know what their data is being used for, and an ongoing right to 
access the data, the GDPR also entitles an individual to have their 
personal data forgotten (i.e., erased), and to prevent further 
dissemination.121 
• Privacy by Design.  In a very forward-thinking move, the GDPR 
requires inclusion of data protection safeguards from the onset of 
designing systems that collect data.  More specifically, “the 
controller shall . . . implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures . . . in an effective manner . . . in order to 
meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of 
data subjects.”122 
What is more important, the GDPR establishes a private right of 
action.123  Article 80(1) provides that “[t]he data subject shall have the 
right to mandate a not-for-profit body, organization or association . . . to 
lodge the complaint on his or her behalf.”124 
2. State Privacy Laws 
States have taken the lead on laws that regulate personal data use and 
collection, with the number growing annually.125 
Some federal privacy laws pre-empt state privacy laws on the same 
topic.  For example, the federal law regulating commercial e-mail and 
the sharing of e-mail addresses pre-empts most state laws regulating 
the same activities.  Conversely, there are many federal privacy laws 
that do not pre-empt state laws, which means that a company can find 
 
119. Id. at 37, art. 7. 
120. Id. at 52–53, art. 33–34. 
121. Id. at 43–44, art. 17. 
122. Id. at 48, art. 25(1). 
123. Id. at 81, art. 82(1). 
124. Id. art. 80(1). 
125. See Jeewon Kim Serrato et al., US States Pass Data Protection Laws on the Heels 
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itself in the position of trying to comply with federal and state privacy 
laws that regulate the same types of data (for example, medical or 
health records) or [the same] types of activit[ies].126 
As the federal government has failed to act in a comprehensive 
manner that empowers consumers, states have taken it upon themselves to 
close the gap with their own legislation.  Although state consumer 
protection legislation is often broadly written, it is also important to 
recognize the limited jurisdiction to which it applies, in that it only impacts 
business within that state.  California and Massachusetts are examined 
below as examples of states that have legislated to close the federal 
consumer protection loopholes. 
a. State law remedies—California data breach notification 
laws 
In response to the significant role technology plays in California’s 
economy, California has lead the nation in recognizing and protecting 
consumer privacy by enacting the first data-breach notification law.127  As 
the first state to enact a security breach notification law, California law 
requires disclosure of any breach by any business “that owns or licenses 
computerized data that includes personal information.”128  The disclosure 
must be made to all California residents “whose unencrypted personal 
information was . . . acquired by an unauthorized person.”129 
Following California’s lead, many other states adopted laws that were 
similar to California and required disclosure of a breach to in-state 
residents.130  Although consumer notification is important, a criticism of 
 
126. Sources of U.S. Data Privacy Law, LEGITIMIS (Sept. 18, 2016), 
http://www.legitimis.de/en/sources-of-u-s-data-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/4J8J-M3JY]; 
see also CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b) (2018); Peter Swire, US Federal Privacy 
Preemption Part 1: History of Federal Preemption of Stricter State Laws, IAPP (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/us-federal-privacy-preemption-part-1-history-of-federal-preemption-
of-stricter-state-laws/ [https://perma.cc/8WKU-4EJ3] (discussing the fact that that three 
federal privacy statutes have provisions regarding pre-emption, including CAN-SPAM, Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, and COPPA). 
127. See O’Connor, supra note 76. 
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2019); see also Forbes Tech. Council, How 
Will California’s Consumer Privacy Law Impact the Data Privacy Landscape?, FORBES 
(Aug. 20, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/08/20/how-
will-californias-consumer-privacy-law-impact-the-data-privacy-landscape/#663c3eaee922 
[https://perma.cc/4LJT-THKT]. 
129. The California statute includes an exception for law enforcement.  Specifically, it 
states, “[t]he notification required by this section may be delayed if a law enforcement agency 
determines that the notification will impede a criminal investigation.  The notification required 
by this section shall be made promptly after the law enforcement agency determines that it 
will not compromise the investigation.”  § 1798.82(c). 
130. See Serrato et al., supra note 125. 
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this approach is that it is reactive as opposed to proactive, only requiring 
action after a breach has occurred.131 
Beyond simple notification, California also sought to significantly 
restrict access to private data through the California Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act,132 which limits the ability of government 
authorities to seek electronic communication information for law 
enforcement purposes.133 
More recently, in July of 2018, California passed the broadest of 
privacy laws in the United States and picked up on several of the 
protections put forth by the European Union’s GDPR.134  The California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (effective January 2020), will provide 
consumers with new rights, including the right to require the deletion of 
their data and request disclosures about how information is collected and 
shared.  Consumers can also direct a data holder specifically not to sell 
their data without additional consent, and upon enactment, individuals 
will have a private right of action to pursue violators after the January 
2020 effective date.135 
b. Massachusetts data protection laws 
Similar to California, Massachusetts has always been on the forefront 
of consumer protection rights.  Looking to both define and prevent data 
security breaches, Massachusetts enacted a regulation which provides an 
extensive “list of technical, physical and administrative security protocols 
aimed at protecting personal information.”136  In addition, these 
 
131. See Jill Joerling, Data Breach Notification Laws: An Argument for a 
Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 467, 483 
(2010) (critiquing notification laws). 
132. See generally California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 2015 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 651 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1546–46.4 (West 2019)). 
133. Some of the limitations of the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
include S.B. 570, which amends the required content of security breach notices, requiring that 
notices clearly and conspicuously display certain prescribed headings.  S.B. 570, 2015–16 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015).  California’s legislature now defines the term “encrypted” for 
purposes of California’s breach notification law as “rendered unusable, unreadable, or 
indecipherable to an unauthorized person through a security technology or methodology 
generally accepted in the field of information technology.”  A.B. 964, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Ca. 2015). 
134. See supra Section II.B.1. 
135. California Consumer Privacy Act, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018) (S.B. 1121) 
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1978.100–78.199) (effective Jan. 1, 2020). 
136. Julie DiMauro, Checklist of Data Protection Best Practices, THOMSON 
REUTERS: REG. INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 15, 2016), https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/
answerson/data-protection-action-items-for-firms/ [https://perma.cc/K2RC-PCWN].  See 
generally Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the 
Commonwealth, 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01–17.05 (2019). 
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Massachusetts companies must take a proactive stance and implement the 
requirements of Title 201 of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, also 
known as the Massachusetts Data Security Regulations, into their existing 
data security programs.137 
The Massachusetts Data Security Regulations instruct data holders 
how to both limit and prevent data breach and also instruct the data holder 
as to what they must do when a breach happens.138  Specifically, the law 
states: 
If you know or have reason to know that your organization has 
experienced a data breach covered by the Breach Notification 
Law, you must [then comply with the Breach Notification Law 
and] send written notices as soon as practicable and without 
unreasonable delay, to: [t]he Attorney General’s Office; [t]he 
Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation; and [t]he 
affected Massachusetts residents . . . .139 
This regulation implements the provisions of Chapter 93H of the 
Massachusetts General Laws, which applies to those who possess (either 
through ownership or lease) personal data of Massachusetts residents.140  
The statute also states the minimum requirements necessary to safeguard 
the data.141  The objectives of this regulation are to “ensure the security 
and confidentiality of customer information in a manner fully consistent 
with industry standards.”142  Accordingly, this regulation seeks to “protect 
against anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such 
information[,] and to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such 
information that may result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any 
consumer.”143  In this context, the term breach is defined by the 
Massachusetts Data Security Regulations as follows: 
[T]he unauthorized acquisition or unauthorized use of unencrypted 
data or, encrypted electronic data and the confidential process or key 
that is capable of compromising the security, confidentiality, or 
integrity of personal information, maintained by a person or agency 
that creates a substantial risk of identity theft or fraud against a resident 
 
137. See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03 (2019). 
138. See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03–17.04 (2019). 
139. Obligations Under the Data Security Regulations and Breach Notification Law, 
MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/obligations-under-the-data-security-
regulations-and-breach-notification-law [https://perma.cc/T9AC-RCUV]; see MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 93H, § 3 (2018). 
140. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 2(a) (2018). 
141. See id. 
142. Id. § 2. 
143. Id. 
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of the commonwealth.  A good faith but unauthorized acquisition of 
personal information by a person or agency, or employee or agent 
thereof, for the lawful purposes of such person or agency, is not a 
breach of security unless the personal information is used in an 
unauthorized manner or subject to further unauthorized disclosure.144 
Commonwealth v. Equifax, Inc. involved an action brought after 
Equifax, Inc suffered a significant data breach that exposed “millions of 
people’s data to unauthorized third parties.”145  Equifax is a credit 
reporting agency that collects and stores consumer data for purposes of 
selling credit reports and credit scores.146  In 2017, third party hackers took 
advantage of a flaw in Equifax’s computer code, thus allowing the thieves 
to steal millions of people’s personal data, including credit card numbers, 
dates or birth, and driver’s license numbers.147 
The Massachusetts Attorney General brought suit against Equifax for 
their failure to safeguard the personal information of Massachusetts 
residents when their databases were breached, and subsequently failing to 
notify these consumers when said breach occurred.148  The attorney 
general was able to convince the court to not dismiss the complaint.149  
Had the attorney general decided not to pursue this matter against Equifax, 
it is uncertain if a private individual would have had standing to do so. 
 
144. 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.02 (2019). 
145. Commonwealth v. Equifax, Inc., No. 1784CV03009BLS2, 2018 WL 3013918, at 
*1 (Mass. Super. Ct., Apr. 3, 2018). 
146. See Geoff Williams, What Is Equifax and Why Does It Have My Financial 
Information?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: MONEY (Sept. 19, 2017, 10:03 AM), 
https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/banking-and-credit/articles/2017-09-
19/what-is-equifax-and-why-does-it-have-my-financial-information. 
147. See Erica R. Hendry, How the Equifax Hack Happened, According to Its CEO, PBS 
NEWS HOUR (Oct. 3, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/equifax-hack-
happened-according-ceo [https://perma.cc/D3VR-HKKK]. 
148. Equifax, Inc., 2018 WL 3013918, at *1. 
149. Id.  Interestingly, Equifax attempted to dismiss the action based on the fact the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had failed to prove any actual harm had occurred as a result 
of the breach.  In dismissing this argument, the court held: 
This argument fails because the Attorney General, unlike a private litigant who 
sues under § 9 or § 11 of c[h]. 93A, is only required to prove that unfair or 
deceptive acts or practice took place in trade or commerce; she is not required to 
prove or quantify resulting economic injury.  The Attorney General may seek 
injunctive relief or civil penalties “[w]henever” she “has reason to believe that any 
person is using or is about to use” an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation 
of the consumer protection act. 
Id. at *5 (second alteration in original) (quoting ch. 93A, § 4).  The court went on to say “[the 
Attorney General] is not required to allege or prove that any individual consumer was actually 
harmed by the allegedly unfair or deceptive act or practice.”  Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Fall 
River Motor Sales, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1205, 1212 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Chatham 
Dev. Co., 731 N.E.2d 89, 91–92 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)). 
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Despite the proactive data security protocols, if a breach does occur, 
Massachusetts, like California, requires consumer notification pursuant to 
Massachusetts General Law chapter 93H.  Specifically, 93H states: 
A person or agency that maintains or stores, but does not own or 
license data that includes personal information about a resident of the 
commonwealth, shall provide notice, as soon as practicable and 
without unreasonable delay, when such person or agency (1) knows or 
has reason to know of a breach of security or (2) when the person or 
agency knows or has reason to know that the personal information of 
such resident was acquired or used by an unauthorized person or used 
for an unauthorized purpose, to the owner or licensor in accordance 
with this chapter.150 
The difficulty of trying to use state law to remedy theft of an 
individual’s data is the enforcement of the law.  Much like their federal 
statutory counterparts, many of the protections created in the state statutes 
and regulations are only enforceable through government actors, not 
individual victims.151  This leaves the decision to pursue redress solely to 
the state.  Thus, decisions to bring an action (or to not bring an action) can 
easily be influenced by the availability of state resources, arbitrary 
decisions regarding the seriousness of the breach, and even politics 
depending on who the wrongdoer may be.152  For example, under chapter 
93H (discussed above), only the Massachusetts Attorney General is 
expressly granted authority to bring suit for enforcement.153 
In Aminpour v. Arbella Mutual Insurance Co., the plaintiff (an 
individual homeowner) brought suit against her homeowner’s insurance 
carrier for various claims, including violation of chapter 93H.154  Without 
evaluating the merits of the security breach claim, the lower court 
dismissed the chapter 93H claim based on lack of standing as the attorney 
general had not taken any action.155  Unfortunately, based on the express 
 
150. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 3(a) (2018). 
151. For a summary of state data protection laws that empower attorneys general, see 
Serrato et al., supra note 125. 
152. See Charlotte Decker, Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument to Update the United States 
Criminal Code to Reflect the Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 1010 
(noting the methods and difficulty of prosecuting cyber crime).  See generally Gregory F. 
Zoeller, Duty to Defend and the Rule of Law, 90 IND. L.J. 513 (2015) (noting the broad 
prosecutorial discretion of the federal government and states’ attorneys general). 
153. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 6 (2018) (“The attorney general may bring an action 
pursuant to section 4 of chapter 93A against a person or otherwise to remedy violations of this 
chapter and for other relief that may be appropriate.”). 
154. See Aminpour v. Arbella Mut. Ins., No. 15-P-32, 2016 WL 4162417, at *1, 3 
(Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 5, 2016). 
155. See id. at *3.  The court noted the lower court’s holding that “on the parties’ cross 
motions for partial summary judgment” the lower court “dismiss[ed] the plaintiff’s claim 
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language of this statute, and subsequent court decisions, individual 
plaintiffs are precluded from bringing an action under chapter 93H against 
a negligent data storage provider in Massachusetts, even if the defendant 
company did, in fact, fail to comply with the statute’s safety 
requirements.156  Ironically, this statute was enacted to protect 
Massachusetts consumers from data breaches; however, the consumers 
themselves cannot seek redress if, in fact, they suffer harm from non-
compliance.157 
c. Other actions by the Massachusetts Attorney General 
The apparent lack of an individual cause of action leaves enforcement 
solely in the hands of the attorney general.  In another matter, the 
Massachusetts Attorney General brought suit against Multi-State Billing 
Services (MSB), a Medicaid billing company, after a laptop that had more 
than 2,600 Massachusetts children’s unencrypted personal data and 
information was stolen.158  The evidence showed that MSB failed “to take 
reasonable steps to safeguard the personal information from unauthorized 
access or use.”159 
[T]he complaint allege[d] that the company failed to develop, 
implement, and maintain a written and comprehensive information 
security program, train members of its workforce on how to 
reasonably safeguard personal information, or maintain a computer 
security system that ensured that personal information stored on laptop 
computers or other portable devices was encrypted.160 
 
under chapter 93H on the ground that there [wa]s no private right of action under this statute.”  
Id. 
156. See Owen Weaver, A Missed Opportunity to Bolster Consumer Protection in 
Massachusetts: How Massachusetts Residents Are Still Without a Private Right of Action After 
the TJX Security Breach, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 677, 704–06 (2009). 
157. See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 806 F. Supp. 2d 452, 458 (D. Mass. 2011). 
More fundamentally, the power to enforce Chapter 93H is limited to the State 
Attorney General—the statute does not incorporate or otherwise authorize a 
private right of action.  The enforcement section of Chapter 93H provides that the 
“attorney general may bring an action pursuant to . . . chapter 93A against a person 
or otherwise to remedy violations of this chapter . . . .”  Because Katz cannot 
maintain an action under Chapter 93A based on an alleged violation of Chapter 
93H, she cannot look to the state consumer protection statute to establish standing. 
Id. (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93H §6 (2018)). 
158. See Press Release, Office of Attorney General Maura Healey, AG Healey Settles 
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MSB consented to paying $100,000 and agreed to implement 
improved security practices after it was “found [to have] violated state 
consumer protection and data security laws.”161 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING DATA SECURITY BY 
STRENGTHENING CONSUMERS’ ABILITY TO SUE 
A. Leveraging and Expanding Existing State Consumer Protection 
Laws 
Massachusetts provides some of the most comprehensive consumer 
protection laws in the country.  Specifically, chapter 93A, section 9 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws states that:  
Any person . . . who has been injured by another person’s use or 
employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by 
section two . . . may bring an action in the superior court, or in the 
housing court as provided in section three of chapter one hundred and 
eighty-five C whether by way of original complaint, counterclaim, 
cross-claim or third party action, for damages and such equitable 
relief, including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and 
proper.162 
The broad language of chapter 93A, section 9 does not appear to limit 
the ability of a data breach victim to file a claim against the data holder.  
Section 2 goes on to allow claims for consumers who have suffered 
“methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce.”163  And although the FTC does not 
allow individuals to file claims,164 the Massachusetts legislature 
specifically stated that in interpreting section 2, “the courts will be guided 
by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
as from time to time amended.”165  The benefit of this language in section 
2 allows individuals to bring claims for unfair and deceptive acts while 
utilizing the broad FTC interpretations to adjudicate the validity of the 
causes of action brought under chapter 93A.  To determine if, in fact, a 
private cause of action may exist for victims of data breach first requires 
an evaluation as to whether being the victim of a data breach constitutes 
 
161. Id. 
162. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (2018). 
163. Id. § 2(a). 
164. See supra Section II.A. 
165. § 2(b) (citation omitted). 
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an unfair and deceptive act.166  Due to the fact that using personal data for 
commercial purposes provides a tremendous value to the online merchant, 
the merchant should be held to have an obligation to safely and effectively 
use, store, transmit, and destroy all data collected. 
The public would best be served if the merchant’s standard of care 
was based not on simple negligence, but rather on a heightened 
reasonableness standard that compares the data holder’s data protection 
practices to best practices in the data storage industry.  If an individual is 
able to make out a prima facie case that a Massachusetts entity did not 
adequately store personal data due to a failure to adhere to industry 
standards, it should be deemed an unfair and deceptive practice for 
purposes of chapter 93A.  Although it may be argued that any 
Massachusetts claims regarding data storage and breach must be evaluated 
using chapter 93H (and thus, can only be brought by the attorney general), 
nothing in chapter 93H indicates it preempts chapter 93A.167  An 
individual bringing the data breach action purely as a chapter 93A claim 
satisfies both the section 2 definition168 to justify a cause of action and 
eliminates the attorney general limitation if the claim were brought subject 
to chapter 93H.  The purpose and legislative history of chapter 93A 
demonstrate its intended broad scope, and nothing in the text indicates that 
the statute would limit data breach causes of action.169  Chapter 93H, on 
the other hand, relates to the creation of regulations for data protection to 
protect consumers collectively, and enforcement when these regulations 
are not followed.  In contrast, chapter 93A is broader in context, and 
allows for claims of unfair and deceptive acts, even if an unfair and 
deceptive act of data theft does not relate to violations of any regulations. 
In addition, it might be possible to argue that individual data breach 
claims might be cognizable under chapter 93H, despite the limiting 
 
166. In Massachusetts, it is well-established that in order “[t]o determine whether a 
particular practice is unfair, courts examine [w]hether the practice . . . is within at least the 
penumbra of some common-law, statutory or other established concept of unfairness; (2) 
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes 
substantial injury to consumers . . . .”  Malden Transp., Inc. v. Uber Tech., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 
3d 264, 273 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, 
Inc., 552 F.3d 47, 69 (1st Cir. 2009). 
167. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H (2018). 
168. “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
93A, § 2(a) (2018). 
169. See Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 17 N.E.3d 1066, 1076 (Mass. 
2014).  “[Chapter 93A] ‘is a statute of broad impact which creates new substantive rights and 
provides new procedural devices for the enforcement of those rights.’  Recovery under the 
statute is not ‘limited by traditional tort and contract law requirements.’”  Id. (citation omitted) 
(quoting Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 772–73 (Mass. 1975)). 
 
2019] PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR VICTIMS OF DATA BREACHES 283 
language that grants the attorney general the power to bring claims.  Note 
that the language granting the attorney general the power to pursue claims 
is not exclusive.  As discussed previously, Chapter 93H exclusively limits 
the ability to pursue recourse under Chapter 93A with the attorney 
general.170  However, nothing in the statute states that the right to bring an 
action is exclusive to the attorney general.  If the legislature had intended 
that the attorney general be the only entity able to pursue enforcement 
under the statute, the language could have been drafted in a manner that 
said: the attorney general is the exclusive entity that may bring an action.  
The current language certainly permits the attorney general to bring an 
action but does not expressly limit the ability of private individuals to do 
so.171 
B. Common Law Remedies—Fraud, Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress, and Breach of Contract 
At common law, fraud generally refers to “an act, omission, or 
concealment in breach of a legal duty, trust, or confidence justly imposed, 
when the breach causes injury to another or the taking of an undue and 
unconscientious advantage.”172  Some courts may find this cause of action 
can be used by individuals to combat data theft.173  Specifically, entrusting 
personal data to a third party for purposes of completing a financial 
transaction creates both a legal and equitable duty by the data holder to 
keep the data reasonably secure and out of the hands of unintended third 
parties.174  In particular, fraud often arises when the data holder engages 
 
170. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 6 (2018). 
171. See Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2009) (“‘The express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule 
suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.’ . . .  [T]herefore, there is clearly no 
express private right of action and, after reviewing the appropriate factors, there is no implied 
private right of action based on a violation of [federal law].” (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001))). 
172. Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
173. See, e.g., Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 
2010 WL 2643307, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010).  “State consumer protection laws 
typically are intended to ‘identify consumer-oriented misconduct which is deceptive and 
materially misleading to a reasonable consumer, and which causes actual damages.’  Such 
laws typically allow individuals to bring a cause of action for consumer fraud or unfair 
competition.”  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Wilner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 893 N.Y.S.2d 208, 
214 (N.Y. App. Div.2010)). 
174. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 390 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 
2016). 
Here, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that their injuries are fairly traceable to 
Nationwide’s conduct.  For example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed “to 
establish and/or implement appropriate administrative, technical and/or physical 
safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of Plaintiff’s and other Class 
Members’ [data] to protect against anticipated threats to the security or integrity 
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in an act or omission that exposes the data to an unauthorized third party.  
Following the conveyance of personal data, the consumer’s data rests in 
the hands of the data holder, and thus its security and protection is solely 
entrusted to the data holder.  As the consumer trusts the data holder to 
protect its data, and the data holder has agreed to hold the data safely and 
securely, failing to take adequate precautions and otherwise allowing the 
data to be accessed by unauthorized third parties is a breach of that trust 
and can also constitute negligence.175 
To succeed on a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim in 
Massachusetts, the following evidence must be satisfied: “(1) negligence; 
(2) emotional distress; (3) causation; (4) physical harm manifested by 
objective symptomatology; and (5) that a reasonable person would have 
suffered emotional distress under the circumstances of the case.”176  
Although challenging, a data theft victim might be successful in pursuing 
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the victim is able 
to demonstrate that the theft has manifested itself in a physical harm with 
objective symptomatology.177  As noted in Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 
“[a] successful negligent infliction of emotional distress claim . . . must 
do more than allege ‘mere upset, dismay, humiliation, grief and anger.’”178  
Accordingly, in order for a plaintiff to be successful in a negligent 
infliction of emotional distress action, in addition to demonstrating that 
 
of such information.”  Although hackers are the direct cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries, 
the hackers were able to access Plaintiffs’ data only because Nationwide allegedly 
failed to secure the sensitive personal information entrusted to its custody.  In other 
words, but for Nationwide’s allegedly lax security, the hackers would not have 
been able to steal Plaintiffs’ data. 
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
175. See generally Anthony E. White, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action 
for Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who is Going to Pay for It?, 88 
MARQ. L. REV. 847 (2005). 
176. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982). 
177. Szanto v. Szanto, No. G039194, 2008 WL 4726452, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 29, 
2008). 
In short, what Phillip alleged, under the label of “identity theft,” was simply an 
amalgam of a claim for conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress: 
i.e., defendant utilized Phillip’s personal identity for his own purposes, without 
Phillip’s knowledge or permission (in other words, that he stole it); that he made 
use of that information in a manner which was “despicable and should not be 
tolerated in a civil society”; and that the conduct caused both economic damages 
and serious emotional distress to Phillip.  Those allegations were sufficient to 
survive demurrer, and the court erred in concluding otherwise simply because the 
allegations had been lumped together under the new label of identity theft. 
Id. 
178. Sullivan v. Bos. Gas Co., 605 N.E.2d 805, 809–10 (Mass. 1993) (quoting Corso v. 
Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 304 (N.H. 1979)). 
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the data holder acted negligently, the victim must have suffered a physical 
manifestation that can be diagnosed and introduced in court. 
C. Expanding FTC to Include a Private Cause of Action 
The FTCA requires heightened data protection and provides 
enhanced protection for consumers but lacks any private enforcement.179  
A congressional adjustment to the FTCA creating a private cause of action 
for data breach violations will encourage data holders to better comply 
with the regulations in order to avoid widespread exposure.  The FTCA 
does a tremendous job of regulating data holders; however, enforcement 
is sparse based on the limited resources of the FTC, and thus only the 
largest and most high-profile breachers are pursued.  By removing the 
FTCA language that limits enforcement, it is hypothesized that individuals 
injured by a data breach would be able to seek enforcement, further 
incentivizing businesses to be exceptionally careful and compliant. 
D. Creating a New Federal Data Security Law Akin to GDPR 
In the alternative to amending the FTCA to allow for a private cause 
of action, Congress could also look to enact a comprehensive overhaul of 
the data privacy law by enacting the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation.180  GDPR provides wide protections for data usage and 
storage and also permits private causes of action.181  Many international 
companies have already invested the time, money and effort to change 
their practices to comply with this law, hence extending this protection to 
their U.S. operations will cause much less effort. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the limited risk of prosecution, the profitability of data theft 
will continue to propel its prevalence.  Accordingly, those entrusted with 
our data need to be vigilant in protecting and combating the increasing 
levels of complexity used by data thieves.  To ensure our data is 
adequately protected, individuals need to have the right to bring suit to 
hold the data keeper liable.  In turn, the potential liability will force the 
data holder to maintain a high level of data security, better protecting all 
consumers and encouraging the continued growth of online commerce.  
By expanding rights under the FTCA to include a private cause of action, 
leveraging existing state and common law expansively, and creating 
 
179. See supra Section II.A. 
180. See generally STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45631, 
DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/
R/R45631 [https://perma.cc/7QFT-DDRS]. 
181. Supra Section II.B.1. 
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comprehensive new federal legislation that mimics the GDPR, consumers 
will be empowered to hold wrongdoers accountable and in turn, encourage 
data holders to maximize data security and protection. 
